This article focuses upon the continuing tensions between the international movement for corporate governance reforms throughout the emerging economies, the insistent capital market pressures for convergence of emerging economies corporate governance towards international standards, the vibrant cultural and institutional tendencies in the emerging economies towards diversity in their corporate governance institutions and practices, and how these distinctive cultures and institutions of the emerging economies represent a vital differentiator which might delineate much of business development of these countries.
Introduction
The emerging markets are engaged in a prolonged and chequered advance of their economies and institutions. In recent years the more rapid growth of the emerging economies compared to the developed economies increasingly was recognised. In a symbolic step the finance ministries and central banks of the respective countries took over from Goldman Sachs in publishing The BRICS Report (2012) , focusing on the synergies and complementarities between the BRICS economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the leading emerging market economies, which encompass over 40 per cent of the world's population, and account for 25 per cent of the total world GDP in terms of purchasing power parity, highlighting their role as growth drivers of the world economy (BRICS 2012:xiii) . The IMF in the 2011 World Economic Outlook report forecast a three speed global economy, with growth strong in emerging and developing economies, recovering in the United States, and weaker in Europe. The emerging markets have become a major destination and source for foreign direct investment, receiving over half the total world FDI inflows and providing a third of the world's FDI outflows in recent years.
What exactly constitute the emerging markets is open to interpretation. The term 'emerging market economies' originated in the period of stock market internationalisation in the 1970s, highlighting the rapid economic progress of certain developing economies. The IMF, UNDP and World Bank each have differing definitions of developed, emerging and low income developing economies with different development thresholds, and the MSCI Emerging Market Index sets different criteria, as do other commercial indices (Nielsen 2011) . However definitions are normally not simply based on level of income and economic growth but also institutional development: "The definition remains, however, a vague and evolving one. The most important features that differentiate emerging economies from the least developed ones are the advanced levels of institutional and regulatory infrastructure, as well as the liberalisation and internationalisation of capital flows and goods (Eurosif 2010 ).
The emerging economies have become increasingly attractive to the leading foreign multinationals searching for new markets, resources and skills. The evolution and sophistication of local markets has been enhanced by the activity of foreign multinationals, According to the McKinsey in absolute terms, the increase has been from $198 billion to $4.4 trillion. This is reflected in the increasing presence of emerging markets in labour intensive manufactured goods including automobiles, computers and books, however the emerging markets are beginning to advance from production capability to innovation capability (Amman and Cantwell 2012) . While the developed economies continue to dominate the flows of knowledge-intensive industries, the emerging economies are developing their foothold in this sector with China having the second largest knowledge intensive flows following the United States (McKinsey Global Institute 2014).
As Kearney (2012) maintains the emerging markets are becoming an economic and social force of growing interest and significance: "Emerging markets comprise the majority of the world's people and land, and they continue to grow faster than the developed world. They are increasingly recognised as a diverse set of business, cultural, economic, financial, institutional, legal, political and social environments within which to test, reassess and renew received wisdoms about how the business world works, to gain deeper insights into prevailing theories and their supporting evidence, and to make new discoveries that will enhance human welfare in all environments including the world's poorest countries, the developing world, the transition countries and the developed world" (Kearney 2012:160) .
However the continuing vulnerability of the emerging market economies to the capital markets of the advanced economies was revealed in 2013, when the Federal Reserve announced the tapering of its post-crisis long term assets purchases, and with interest rates apparently set to rise, there was a resulting flight of capital back to the US (Davies 2014) .
Further the prospects of a hard landing for the Chinese economy became real as efforts by the Chinese authorities to attempt to switch away from an investment and export-driven growth model to one more focused on domestic consumer spending. Finally the end of the inflated global commodity-cycle posed a threat to all commodity producers, particularly in the emerging markets. This has refocused attention not only on any economic weaknesses in the emerging markets, but on the political and policy instability in emerging markets, and continuing weaknesses in institutional development. This was a sharp reminder of how in the recent past the seemingly inexorable advance of emerging economies has been thrown into crises as in Mexico 1994-95; East Asia 1997 -1998 Russia 1998; Brazil 2000 and Argentina 2002. Corporate governance is widely identified as critical to the institutional development of the emerging economies, and as an essential basis for stable and sustained economic growth.
This article focuses upon the continuing tensions between the international movement for corporate governance reforms throughout the emerging economies, the insistent capital market pressures for convergence of emerging economies corporate governance towards international standards, the vibrant cultural and institutional tendencies in the emerging economies towards diversity in their corporate governance institutions and practices, and how these distinctive cultures and institutions of the emerging economies represent a vital differentiator which might delineate much of business development of these countries.
This theoretical approach is a contribution to the varieties of capitalism literature comparing different models of capitalism from alternative analytical frameworks highlighting the nature and extent of diverse forms of capitalism, their relative strengths and weaknesses, and the prospects for institutional diversity when confronted with growing pressures for international economic integration . The varieties of capitalism thesis elaborated by Hall and Soskice (2001) adopts a firm centred approach focusing on the incentives for coordination; a wider typology of governance mechanisms in terms of social systems of production is offered by Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) ; and a national business systems approach of Whitley (1999) examines the internal capacities of business firms. In summary this approach theorises that:
i.
firstly national economies are characterised by distinct institutional configurations that generate system logics of economic action;
ii. secondly there is comparative institutional advantage in which different institutional arrangements have distinctive strengths and weaknesses for different kinds of economic activity; and iii. thirdly there is institutional path dependence (Jackson and Deeg 2006:3) In pursuing a dynamic interpretation of institutional impact and the linkages between institutions and the wider political economy, this article examines the development of corporate governance in emerging markets, and the relationships between governance and regulation and economic growth are considered. The BRICS economies, institutions and governance are used as an illustration to demonstrate the differences between the BRICS and the dominant Anglo-American model of legal and regulatory structures. Finally how the pressures from capital markets for convergence are confronted by the resilience of continuing cultural and institutional differences is explored, concluding with an argument for cultural and institutional diversity of different governance models as the basis for dynamic differentiation in industries and markets.
The Development of Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets
There are many interpretations of what corporate governance encompasses. A simple yet broad definition was offered by the UK Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Committee 1992) : "Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled." But corporate governance has wider implications and is critical to economic and social well-being, firstly in providing the incentives and performance measures to achieve business success, and secondly in providing the accountability and transparency to ensure the equitable distribution of the resulting wealth.
The significance of corporate governance for the stability and equity of society is captured in the broader definition of the concept offered by Cadbury for the World Bank (2000):
"Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals. The governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society."
Indeed the OECD proposed a broader and more responsible definition and purpose of corporate governance when it first published the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance:
"A good corporate governance regime helps to assure that corporations use their capital efficiently. Good corporate governance helps, too, to ensure that corporations take into account the interests of a wide range of constituencies, as well as of the communities in which they operate, and that their boards are accountable to the company and to the shareholders. This, in turn, helps to assure that corporations operate for the benefit of society as a whole. It helps to maintain the confidence of investors -both foreign and domestic -and to attract more 'patient' long term capital" (OECD 1999: 7) .
Business corporations have a considerable and enduring impact upon societies and economies, and how corporations are governed -their ownership and control, the objectives they pursue, the rights they respect, the responsibilities they recognize, and how they distribute the value they create -has become a matter of the greatest significance, not simply for their directors and shareholders, but for the wider communities they serve. Secondly a concentrated ownership model characterised by controlling shareholders, weaker securities markets, and less disclosure and transparency, and often with a monitoring role for banks with a stake in the company. The dichotomous ownership models are described by a variety of names including market systems and block-holder systems, rules based and relationship based systems, and market based and bank based systems, but the simplest characterisation is between outsider and insider based systems.
Outsider market based systems are typified by dispersed ownership, a clearer separation of ownership and control, lower debt to equity ratios, and more sophisticated financial markets.
In this system there is apparently less incentive for outsiders to attempt to participate in the control of the corporation, except through equity markets. The interests of outside investors are not formally represented in the governance of the corporations, and investors often have less interest in the strategic goals of the enterprise than in short term returns. In contrast insider, relationship based systems are typified by highly concentrated ownership which is closely connected to managerial control of the enterprise, with high debt to equity ratios, and with a higher rate of bank debt due to the close relationship with banks who are often represented on the boards of major corporations with other stakeholders including related firms. In these systems hostile takeovers rarely occur, and there is a dense network of supportive relationships with related businesses that can lead to collusion. As Aguilera and Jackson (2010) conclude these models or frameworks of corporate governance remain useful, but need to be refined to fit the empirical realities of different countries. Claessens and Yurtoglu (2012: 3) offer a useful distinction between two aspects of corporate governance: "The first set of definitions concerns itself with a set of behavioural patterns: that is, the actual behaviour of corporations, in terms of such measures as performance, efficiency, growth, financial structure, and treatment of shareholders and other stakeholders.
The second set concerns itself with the normative framework: that is, the rules under which firms are operating-with the rules coming from such sources as the legal system, the judicial system, financial markets, and factor (labour) markets." At its most legal and formal, corporate governance focuses on the rules of capital markets governing equity investments in listed companies, including listing requirements, insider dealing, disclosure and accounting, and the protection of minority shareholder rights. In an authoritative statement of the mainstream view, the benefits of robust corporate governance have been concisely summarised by Claessens and Yurtoglu as:
 Increased access to external financing by firms can lead, in turn, to larger investment, higher growth, and greater employment creation.
 Lowering of the cost of capital and associated higher firm valuation makes more investments attractive to investors, also leading to growth and more employment.
 Better operational performance through better allocation of resources and better management creates wealth more generally.
 Reduced risk of financial crises, which is particularly important given that financial crises can have large economic and social costs.
 Better relationships with all stakeholders, which helps improve social and labor relationships, and help address such issues as environmental protection, and can help further reduce poverty and inequality (2012:12).
To an important degree, all of these claims regarding the potential benefits of corporate governance have substance, and the economies that have worked to develop the robustness of their corporate regulation and corporate governance have generally been among the most successful, the corollary also being true that economies that have marginalised and neglected corporate regulation and institutions, or abandoned these to systemic corruption, have indeed The concentration of ownership common throughout emerging economies has profound implications. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) surveyed 27 countries and conclude that "the principal agency problem in large corporations around the world is that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders. " Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (1999) identify the ownership\ structure of firms in nine East Asian countries and conclude that the main corporate governance problem in these countries is the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders. Lins (2000) relates ownership structure to firm value across 22 emerging markets. This research traces through pyramidal shareholding structures to identify a firm's ultimate owners (Gibson 1999) . La
Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) demonstrate that in countries where the legal system does not do a good job of protecting shareholders' rights, concentrated ownership is more prevalent. If legal, regulatory and market institutions are relatively undeveloped this will have further consequences. In advanced economies, companies are disciplined by a combination of internal and external controls. Internally the company directors' duty is to ensure adequate financial controls are exercised, and this is reinforced by independent audit of the annual accounts. Externally there is a legal framework of corporate law, policed by regulatory authorities. Finally there is the capital market which exercises a commercial discipline upon companies. While these institutional structures might have been in place in the emerging economies in the past, often they did not work properly, as Prowse (1998) concludes:
"In a less evolved regulatory, legal and institutional environment, information asymmetries are more severe, contracting costs are higher because standard practices have not been developed, enforcement of contracts is more problematic because of weak courts, market participants and regulators are less experienced, and the economy itself is likely to be undergoing more rapid change than in developed countries. In such circumstances it is not surprising that the competitive environment is weaker and markets do not work as well as in developed countries. In addition to having a weak judicial system, developing countries are unlikely to have administrative agencies that can handle issues that benefit from detailed rule making and non-legal administrative enforcement, such as accounting standards, financial disclosures and stock market listing rules."
Where the institutional and regulatory processes do not work properly, there is even greater reliance on firm-level corporate governance in emerging economies to reassure investors (Francis et al 2003) . As Bell et al (2014) The question is -will the continuing weaknesses of these governance and legal institutions in the emerging market economies put any limit upon further international growth, and make more vulnerable the existing gains of the high growth emerging economies? Earlier economic crises in the emerging market economies induced by inadequate financial, regulatory and governance institutions have often proved very sharp, but short-lived as in the Asian financial crisis, where an export-led recovery fuelled renewed growth, followed by a further effort at reform and institution building (Clarke 1999; Haley and Richter 2002) . Table 1 Growth of Emerging Economies
The Sustained Economic Growth of the Emerging Market Economies
Though corporate governance and regulatory institutions remain in a developmental stage in most of the emerging market economies, this in itself has not impeded significant and sustained economic growth. In the large BRICS economies, China and India have continued with impressive growth rates despite uncertainty in the global economy, South Africa and
Brazil have slowed, and Russia has meandered along its own unpredictable geo-political path (IMF 2014) . The overall advance of the major emerging market economies including the BRICs despite governance institutions at various stages of development, suggests there are other strengths to these economies that promote dynamic entrepreneurship. Indeed the pattern of growth in the emerging economies compared to the advanced economies from 2000 to 2014 suggests the era of the advanced economy domination of the global economy may be drawing to a close, and could be replaced by a multi-polar world economy in the coming decades (Table 1) . It is quite unlikely that the economic hegemony the advanced economies enjoyed in the period from the 1960s through to the end of the 1990s will return.
It is not just the emerging market economies that have experienced burgeoning growth, they have been joined by the low income countries (LICs) that have made a comeback in the last two decades, more LIC economies have experienced take-offs, and these have lasted longer in duration than earlier episodes of take-off. Growth in the LIC's output per capita rebounded beginning in the 1990s. Furthermore, they have grown at a faster pace than advanced China has a diversified economy with large Chinese multinationals, overseas multinationals, large state enterprises, and town and village enterprises that were often significant players, together with a rump of small private enterprises, all with distinctive modes of governance (Clarke 1998) . As the market sector and equity markets have grown rapidly, corporate governance has attracted more interest. From meagre beginnings the China A-share market has expanded massively over the last two decades. The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges now have more than 2,500 stocks with a total market capitalization of about US even though the precise number is difficult to ascertain. An inefficient, resource-draining stock market is a drag on the Chinese economy and may hamper its ability to maintain the 7-8 percent growth required to keep unemployment in check" (Liu 2006 ).
However despite the froth of China's stock exchanges it is often private businesses that are thriving. Qian and Qian (2005) suggest that China's experience is an important qualification of the law, institutions, finance and growth literature: "Neither its legal nor financial system is well developed, yet it has one of the fastest growing economies. While the law-financegrowth nexus applies to the state sector and the listed sector, with arguably poorer applicable legal and financial mechanisms, the private sector grows much faster than the others and provides most of the economy's growth. The imbalance among the three sectors suggests that alternative financing channels and governance mechanisms, such as those based on reputation and relationships, support the growth of the private sector."
SOUTH AFRICA
After some decades of halting growth Africa has sustained a 4.9 per cent compound rate of South Africa has maintained a sophisticated legal, regulatory and corporate governance system, with a well-developed stock market representing 278% of GDP. It compares well with both Europe and the United States in the application of international codes of corporate governance policy and practice. South Africa has gone beyond standard corporate governance approaches, and introduced the concept of sustainability and corporate environmental and social responsibility into its corporate governance code, and is one of the first economies to consider integrated reporting on these aspects of business performance with financial
reporting. This is a pioneering effort to link shareholders and stakeholders interests.
Table 2 Different Approaches to Corporate Governance in BRICS Emerging Markets
This brief survey of the major BRICS economies demonstrates the considerable differentiation that exists between them, but even more so, with the exception of South Africa, the BRIC economies stand in stark contrast to the Anglo-American model of developed legal and regulatory structures, and market oriented corporate governance.
Capital Market Pressures for Convergence in Corporate Governance
Intense debate over the last decade has concerned the relative merits of the different corporate governance systems, often with the assumption that the Anglo-American system with stronger security markets and higher levels of disclosure represents a more advanced and efficient mode of corporate finance and governance, and leading to the conclusion that inevitably there will be either an early, or more gradual, shift of the European and Asian to the underlying weaknesses in corporate governance and had taken action. I was more sceptical. I had argued that perhaps the most fundamental flaw had to do with stock options, which provided incentives for bad accounting and short-sighted behavior (Stiglitz 2003b) . But nothing was done. I and others had worried too about the bonus system that had encouraged excessive risk taking and the lack of regulation.
I had worried that securitization was increasing problems of information asymmetries
and decreasing the quality of lending (Stiglitz 2003a) . Few would say today that the institutions of the U.S. financial sector-its rating agencies, its regulatory authorities, or its commercial or investment banks-are exemplary" (World Bank 2009:147) .
The era of unquestioned Anglo-American institutional ascendancy may be drawing to a close.
As Keaneand Velde (2011) As Aguilera and Jackson (2010) state when corporate governance practices, especially those tied to a shareholder value ideology are exported from the United States to other countries "they tend to be translated and recombined with the local practices before they are adopted.
As a result, only certain dimensions of the governance practice are fully implemented and their adaptation often leads to new or hybrid forms of these practices" (2010: 487). The
Asian Productivity Organisation expresses the bewilderment often caused by the unthinking imposition of corporate governance regimes which make little local sense: "Corporate governance is not only a method firms use to discipline themselves while remaining profitable. It is also one of the principal ways they "make the society" in which they operate and which in turn "makes" them. If this relationship is obscured, it is because the existing policy and regulatory environment confronts firms with an apparently ready-made and opaque organization of means and ends, in which compliance is necessary but over whose purpose the majority of organizations, whether companies or civil society groups, have little or no control."
Aras and Crowther (2008) concepts that are largely defined by the cultural and personal contexts in which they exist.
Concepts of equity, fairness, and stewardship have deep moorings" (2011).
A consequence of the differences in corporate governance structure and objectives, and the underlying values and cultures in which they are practiced, is that the different systems demonstrate unique strengths and weaknesses: essentially they are good at doing different things, and they all have weaknesses (Moerland 1995; Dore et al. 2002) . The AngloAmerican governance system supports a dynamic market orientation, with fluid capital which can quickly chase market opportunities wherever they occur. The downside of this system is the corollary of its strength: the inherent volatility, short termism and inadequate governance procedures that have often left US manufacturing industry stranded, and caused periodic stock market panics and occasional crashes. In marked contrast European enterprise as typified by the German governance system traditionally has committed to a long term industrial strategy supported by stable capital investment and robust governance procedures that build enduring relationships with key stakeholders (Cernat 2004; Lane 2003) . This was the foundation of the German economic miracle which carried the country forward to becoming the leading exporter in the world of products. Again the weaknesses of the German system were the corollary of its strengths: the depth of relationships leading to a lack of flexibility, that made it difficult to pursue initiatives for new businesses and industries while accumulating costs in established companies.
The Latin variant of European corporate governance as practiced in France and Italy is highly network oriented, with dominant holdings by the state, families, or industrial groups.
Ownership concentration provides for stability and long term horizons, with strong relationships with stakeholders. This governance system has allowed the Southern European countries to specialize in selected industries with notable success. However weak governance accountability and frequent network and pyramid control diminishes the integrity of the equity market: the strength of the blockholder relationships precluding others from becoming involved. Finally, the Asian corporate governance system is the most network based of all, with the firm as the institutional centre of long enduring and deep economic relationships of investors, employees, suppliers and customers . In the Japanese system there is a close dependence on bank finance and insider control. This approach has yielded the longest investment horizons of all and was the key to the Japanese success in progressively dominating overseas markets. The Japanese economic miracle came to an abrupt end when paying the price for its own success, the hugely speculative bubble burst in the early 1990s, the resulting decade-long disorientation revealing the weaknesses of secretive and unaccountable Japanese governance. 
Conclusions
The narrative of international corporate governance policy and practice in recent decades has proved simplistic and misleading. Principles of honesty, integrity, accountability, transparency and fair dealing are fundamental to the viability and trustworthiness of any corporate system possessing, or actively seeking, external investors. However to assume that these principles are bound up with one system of corporate governance, and other systems of governance invariably lack these essential foundations is one-dimensional xenophobia. The assumption that the Anglo-American system alone represents best policy and practice is at best naïve, and at worst part of an ideological thrust to ensure Anglo-American investment interests remain paramount wherever in the world they exist. All systems of corporate governance have serious weaknesses as well as strengths, and this includes the AngloAmerican system which has been at the epicentre of major corporate governance collapses in the 21 st century, including the global financial crisis. European and Asia-Pacific governance systems demonstrate strengths and weaknesses too. While economic growth has slowed in Europe, the more inclusive and responsible system of corporate governance practiced there has often maintained more cohesive economies and societies. In the Asia Pacific, and throughout the more dynamic emerging markets, despite ostensibly weaker corporate governance systems, high rates of economic growth have been consistently sustained.
This is not to suggest that corporate governance systems and business growth are unconnected, simply that the apparent weaknesses in corporate governance in the Asia Pacific and elsewhere in the emerging markets have not in themselves held back growth.
However it remains clear that prosperous economies require strong institutional foundations in the longer term. If the prosperity of the emerging markets is to be sustained, there will need to be attention to building the viability and strength of their regulatory and governance institutions, which does not mean the unthinking adoption of Anglo-American models. For the economies of the developing world to achieve their true potential and sustain their performance, what is required is for them to improve their own governance system rather than to adopt Anglo-American practices that might lead to hybrid ineffective forms of governance. Governance reform should be designed according to the ethical foundations and values of the society in question to remain vital and meaningful, and to contribute to balanced economic development.
